Ylarde vs. Aquino

G.R. No. L-33722 July 29, 1988
GANCAYCO, J.:

In this petition for review on certiorari seeking the reversal of the decision of the Court of Appeals, a case which originated from the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, We are again caned upon determine the responsibility of the principals and teachers towards their students or pupils. 

Facts:
Mariano Soriano was the principal of the Gabaldon Primary School, a public educational institution located in Tayug, Pangasinan. Edgardo Aquino was a teacher therein. At that time, the school was fittered with several concrete blocks which were remnants of the old school shop that was destroyed in World War II. Realizing that the huge stones were serious hazards to the schoolchildren, another teacher by the name of Sergio Banez started burying them one by one.

Deciding to help his colleague, Aquino gathered eighteen of his male pupils, aged ten to eleven, after class dismissal. Being their teacher-in-charge, he ordered them to dig beside a one-ton concrete block in order to make a hole wherein the stone can be buried. The work was left unfinished. The following day, also after classes, Aquino called four of the original eighteen pupils to continue the digging. These four pupils — Reynaldo Alonso, Francisco Alcantara, Ismael Abaga and Novelito Ylarde, dug until the excavation was one meter and forty centimeters deep.

When the depth was right enough to accommodate the concrete block, Aquino and his four pupils got out of the hole. Then, Aquino left the children to level the loose soil around the open hole while he went to see Banez who was about thirty meters away. Private respondent wanted to borrow from Banez the key to the school workroom where he could get some rope.

Three of the four kids, Alonso, Alcantara and Ylarde, playfully jumped into the pit. Then, without any warning at all, the remaining Abaga jumped on top of the concrete block causing it to slide down towards the opening. Alonso and Alcantara were able to scramble out of the excavation on time but unfortunately fo Ylarde, the concrete block caught him before he could get out, pinning him to the wall in a standing position. As a result thereof, Ylarde sustained injuries and died three days after.

Ylarde's parents, petitioners in this case, filed a suit for damages against Aquino and Soriano. The lower court dismissed the complaint on the following grounds: (1) that the digging done by the pupils is in line with their course called Work Education; (2) that Aquino exercised the utmost diligence of a very cautious person; and (3) that the demise of Ylarde was due to his own reckless imprudence. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the lower court. 

Issues: 
 1)Whether or not Soriano is liable for damages under Art. 2180.
2) Whether or not Aquino is liable for damages under Art. 2176.
Held:

As regards the principal, We hold that he cannot be made responsible for the death of the child Ylarde, he being the head of an academic school and not a school of arts and trades. This is in line with Our ruling in Amadora vs. Court of Appeals, 4 wherein this Court thoroughly discussed the doctrine that under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, it is only the teacher and not the head of an academic school who should be answerable for torts committed by their students. This Court went on to say that in a school of arts and trades, it is only the head of the school who can be held liable.  Teachers in general shall be liable for the acts of their students except where the school is technical in nature, in which case it is the head thereof who shall be answerable. Following the canon of reddendo singula sinquilis 'teachers' should apply to the words "pupils and students' and 'heads of establishments of arts and trades to the word "apprentices." Soriano, as principal, cannot be held liable for the reason that the school he heads is an academic school and not a school of arts and trades. Besides, as clearly admitted by private respondent Aquino, private respondent Soriano did not give any instruction regarding the digging. 
  
Aquino is liable for damages, it is very clear that private respondent Aquino acted with fault and gross negligence when he: (1) failed to avail himself of services of adult manual laborers and instead utilized his pupils aged ten to eleven to make an excavation near the one-ton concrete stone which he knew to be a very hazardous task; (2) required the children to remain inside the pit even after they had finished digging, knowing that the huge block was lying nearby and could be easily pushed or kicked aside by any pupil who by chance may go to the perilous area; (3) ordered them to level the soil around the excavation when it was so apparent that the huge stone was at the brink of falling; (4) went to a place where he would not be able to check on the children's safety; and (5) left the children close to the excavation, an obviously attractive nuisance. 

The negligent act of Aquino in leaving his pupils in such a dangerous site has a direct causal connection to the death of the child Ylarde. Left by themselves, it was but natural for the children to play around. Tired from the strenuous digging, they just had to amuse themselves with whatever they found. Driven by their playful and adventurous instincts and not knowing the risk they were facing three of them jumped into the hole while the other one jumped on the stone. Since the stone was so heavy and the soil was loose from the digging, it was also a natural consequence that the stone would fall into the hole beside it, causing injury on the unfortunate child caught by its heavy weight. Everything that occurred was the natural and probable effect of the negligent acts of  Aquino. Needless to say, the child Ylarde would not have died were it not for the unsafe situation created by private respondent Aquino which exposed the lives of all the pupils concerned to real danger. 

In ruling that the child Ylarde was imprudent, it is evident that the lower court did not consider his age and maturity. This should not be the case. The degree of care required to be exercised must vary with the capacity of the person endangered to care for himself. A minor should not be held to the same degree of care as an adult, but his conduct should be judged according to the average conduct of persons of his age and experience.The standard of conduct to which a child must conform for his own protection is that degree of care ordinarily exercised by children of the same age, capacity, discretion, knowledge and experience under the same or similar circumstances.  Bearing this in mind, We cannot charge the child Ylarde with reckless imprudence.



The court is not persuaded that the digging done by the pupils can pass as part of their Work Education. A single glance at the picture showing the excavation and the huge concrete block would reveal a dangerous site requiring the attendance of strong, mature laborers and not ten-year old grade-four pupils. We cannot comprehend why the lower court saw it otherwise when Aquino himself admitted that there were no instructions from the principal requiring what the pupils were told to do. Nor was there any showing that it was included in the lesson plan for their Work Education.
 
The contention that Aquino exercised the utmost diligence of a very cautious person is certainly without cogent basis. A reasonably prudent person would have foreseen that bringing children to an excavation site, and more so, leaving them there all by themselves, may result in an accident. An ordinarily careful human being would not assume that a simple warning "not to touch the stone" is sufficient to cast away all the serious danger that a huge concrete block adjacent to an excavation would present to the children. Moreover, a teacher who stands in loco parentis to his pupils would have made sure that the children are protected from all harm in his company. 

Full text: http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1988/jul1988/gr_l_33722_1988.html

Philippine Rabbit vs. People of the Philippines


Philippine Rabbit vs. People
G.R. No. 147703             April 14, 2004
PANGANIBAN, J.:

Facts: Napoleon Roman was found guilty and convicted of the crime of reckless imprudence resulting to triple homicide, multiple physical injuries and damage to property and was sentenced to suffer imprisonment and to pay damages. The court further ruled that in the event of the insolvency of accused, petitioner shall be liable for the civil liabilities of the accused. Evidently, the judgment against accused had become final and executory.

Admittedly, accused had jumped bail and remained at-large. The CA ruled that the institution of a criminal case implied the institution also of the civil action arising from the offense. Thus, once determined in the criminal case against the accused-employee, the employer’s subsidiary civil liability as set forth in Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code becomes conclusive and enforceable.

Issue: Whether or not an employer, who dutifully participated in the defense of its accused-employee, may appeal the judgment of conviction independently of the accused.

Held: No.  It is well-established in our jurisdiction that the appellate court may, upon motion or motu proprio, dismiss an appeal during its pendency if the accused jumps bail. This rule is based on the rationale that appellants lose their standing in court when they abscond.

2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure has clarified what civil actions are deemed instituted in a criminal prosecution. When a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged shall be deemed instituted with the criminal action unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves the right to institute it separately or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action.

Only the civil liability of the accused arising from the crime charged is deemed impliedly instituted in a criminal action; that is, unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves the right to institute it separately, or institutes it prior to the criminal action. Hence, the subsidiary civil liability of the employer under Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code may be enforced by execution on the basis of the judgment of conviction meted out to the employee.

What is deemed instituted in every criminal prosecution is the civil liability arising from the crime or delict per se, but not those liabilities arising from quasi-delicts, contracts or quasi-contracts. In fact, even if a civil action is filed separately, the ex delicto civil liability in the criminal prosecution remains, and the offended party may -- subject to the control of the prosecutor -- still intervene in the criminal action, in order to protect the remaining civil interest therein.

The cases dealing with the subsidiary liability of employers uniformly declare that, strictly speaking, they are not parties to the criminal cases instituted against their employees. Although in substance and in effect, they have an interest therein, this fact should be viewed in the light of their subsidiary liability. While they may assist their employees to the extent of supplying the latter’s lawyers, as in the present case, the former cannot act independently on their own behalf, but can only defend the accused.

As a matter of law, the subsidiary liability of petitioner now accrues. Under Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code, employers are subsidiarily liable for the adjudicated civil liabilities of their employees in the event of the latter’s insolvency. Thus, in the dispositive portion of its decision, the trial court need not expressly pronounce the subsidiary liability of the employer. In the absence of any collusion between the accused-employee and the offended party, the judgment of conviction should bind the person who is subsidiarily liable. In effect and implication, the stigma of a criminal conviction surpasses mere civil liability.

To allow employers to dispute the civil liability fixed in a criminal case would enable them to amend, nullify or defeat a final judgment rendered by a competent court. By the same token, to allow them to appeal the final criminal conviction of their employees without the latter’s consent would also result in improperly amending, nullifying or defeating the judgment. The decision convicting an employee in a criminal case is binding and conclusive upon the employer not only with regard to the former’s civil liability, but also with regard to its amount. The liability of an employer cannot be separated from that of the employee.

The subsidiary liability of petitioner is incidental to and dependent on the pecuniary civil liability of the accused-employee. Since the civil liability of the latter has become final and enforceable by reason of his flight, then the former’s subsidiary civil liability has also become immediately enforceable. Respondent is correct in arguing that the concept of subsidiary liability is highly contingent on the imposition of the primary civil liability.

Borromeo vs. Sun

Borromeo vs Sun
G.R. No. 75908. October 22, 1999
PURISIMA, J





At bar is a Petition for review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court seeking to set aside the Resolution of the then Intermediate Appellate Court, which reversed its earlier Decision setting aside the Decision of the former Court of the First Instance of Rizal.



Facts: 

Amancio Sun brought before the then Court of the First Instance of Rizal an action against Lourdes O. Borromeo (in her capacity as corporate secretary), Federico O. Borromeo and Federico O. Borromeo (F.O.B.), Inc., to compel the transfer to his name in the books of F.O.B., Inc., shares of stock registered in the name of Federico O. Borromeo, as evidenced by a Deed of Assignment. Private respondent averred that all the shares of stock of F.O.B. Inc. registered in the name of Federico O. Borromeo belong to him, as the said shares were placed in the name of Federico O. Borromeo 'only to give the latter personality and importance in the business world.' On the other hand, petitioner Federico O. Borromeo disclaimed any participation in the execution of the Deed of Assignment, theorizing that his supposed signature thereon was forged. LL



The lower court of origin came out with a decision declaring the questioned signature on subject Deed of Assignment as the genuine signature of Federico O. Borromeo. After considering the testimonies of the two expert witnesses for the parties and after a careful and judicious study and analysis of the questioned signature as compared to the standard signatures. On appeal by petitioners, the Court of Appeals adjudged as forgery the controverted signature of Federico O. Borromeo. Amancio Sun interposed a motion for reconsideration of the said decision, contending that Segundo Tabayoyong, petitioners' expert witness, is not a credible witness. Acting on the aforesaid motion for reconsideration, the Court of Appeals reconsidered its decision.



Issue: WON the signature of Frederico O. Borromeo in the Deed of Assignments is a genuine signature.



Held:

Pertinent records reveal that the subject Deed of Assignment is embodied in blank form for the assignment of shares with authority to transfer such shares in the books of the corporation. It was clearly intended to be signed in blank to facilitate the assignment of shares from one person to another at any future time. This is similar to Section 14 of the Negotiable Instruments Law where the blanks may be filled up by the holder, the signing in blank being with the assumed authority to do so. Indeed, as the shares were registered in the name of Federico O. Borromeo just to give him personality and standing in the business community, private respondent had to have a counter evidence of ownership of the shares involved. Thus, the execution of the deed of assignment in blank, to be filled up whenever needed. The same explains the discrepancy between the date of the deed of assignment and the date when the signature was affixed thereto.

While it is true that the 1974 standard signature of Federico O. Borromeo is to the naked eye dissimilar to his questioned signature circa 1954-1957, which could have been caused by sheer lapse of time, Col. Jose Fernandez, respondent's expert witness, found the said signatures similar to each other after subjecting the same to stereomicroscopic examination and analysis because the intrinsic and natural characteristic of Federico O. Borromeo's handwriting were present in all the exemplar signatures used by both Segundo Tabayoyong and Col. Jose Fernandez.




Case Doctrines on Negotaible Instruments Law


Philippine Education Co. vs. Soriano
The Weight of authority in the United States is that postal money orders are not negotiable instruments, the reason being that in establishing and operating a postal money order system, the government is not engaged in commercial transactions but merely exercises a governmental power for the public benefit. Moreover, some of the restrictions imposed upon money orders by postal laws and regulations are inconsistent with the character of negotiable instruments. For instance, such laws and regulations usually provide for not more than one endorsement; payment of money orders may be withheld under a variety of circumstances.

Caltex Phil. vs. Court of Appeals
A negotiable instrument that is payable to bearer may be negotiated by mere delivery. No further act other than delivery is necessary in order to negotiate the instrument and to make the transferee a holder.

Metrobank vs. Court of Appeals
An instrument to be negotiable instrument must contain an unconditional promise or orders to pay a sum certain in money. As provided by Sec 3 of NIL an unqualified order or promise to pay is unconditional though coupled with: 1st, an indication of a particular fund out of which reimbursement is to be made or a particular account to be debited with the amount; or 2nd, a statement of the transaction which give rise to the instrument. But an order to promise to pay out of particular fund is not unconditional.

Sesbreno vs. Court of Appeals
Only an instrument qualifying as a negotiable instrument under the relevant statute may be negotiated either by indorsement thereof coupled with delivery, or by delivery alone if it is in bearer form. A negotiable instrument, instead of being negotiated, may also be assigned or transferred. The legal consequences of negotiation and assignment of the instrument are different. A negotiable instrument may not be negotiated but may be assigned or transferred, absent an express prohibition against assignment or transfer written in the face of the instrument.

Firestone Tire & rubber Co. vs. Court of Appeals
Withdrawal slips are non negotiable instruments. The essence of negotiability which characterizes a negotiable paper as a credit instrument lies in its freedom to circulate freely as a substitute for money. The withdrawal slips lacked this character.

Ang Tek Lian vs. Court of Appeals
A check drawn payable to the order of “cash” is a check payable to bearer and the bank may pay it to the person presenting it for payment without the drawer’s indorsement. However, if the bank is not sure of the bearer’s identity or financial solvency, it has the right to demand identification or assurance against possible complication. But where the bank is satisfied of the identity or economic standing of the bearer who tenders the check for collection, it will pay the instrument without further question; and it would incur no liability to the drawer in thus acting.

Development Bank of the Phils. vs. Sima Wei
The payee of a negotiable instrument acquires no interest with respect thereto until its delivery to him. Delivery of an instrument means transfer of possession, actual or constructive, from one person to another. Without the initial delivery of the instrument from the drawer to the payee, there can be no liability on the instrument. Moreover, such delivery must be intended to give effect to the instrument.

Philippine Bank of Commerce vs. Aruego
There is a difference between a qualified indorser and a person negotiating by mere delivery. While a qualified indorser warrants to all subsequent holders, the warranties of the person negotiating by mere delivery extends only in favor of his immediate transferee.

Francisco vs. Court of Appeals
The negotiable Instruments Law  provides  that  when  a person is under obligation to indorse in a representative capacity, he may indorse in such terms as to negative personal liability.  An agent, when so signing, should indicate that he is merely signing as an agent in behalf of the  principal  and  must  disclose  the  name  of  his  principal.    Otherwise, he will  be  held  liable  personally

Jail-Alai vs. Bank of the Philippine Islands
Holders of checks may obtain payment from the drawee bank by presenting it for payment directly with the bank or by depositing it in his account in another bank known as the collecting bank or depositary bank. When the holder deposits his check with the collecting bank, the nature of the relationship created at that stage is one of agency, that is the bank is to collect from the drawee of the check the corresponding proceeds.

Republic Bank vs. Ebreda              
Where the signature on a negotiable instrument is forged, the negotiation of the check is without force or effect. However, where a check has several indorsersment on it, it is only the negotiation based on the forged or unauthorized signature is inoperative. It will not render void all the other negotiations of the check with respect to other parties whose signatures are genuine.

MWSS vs. Court of Appeals
It is basic that whoever alleges forgery must prove such fact. Forgery cannot be presumed, it must be duly established.

Banco de Oro vs. Equitable Banking Corporation           
If the instrument involved is a check, the drawee cannot charge the account of the drawer if the payee’s or indorser’s signature is forged. The drawee, in turn has the right of recourse against the collecting bank.
The drawer generally owes no duty of diligence to the collecting bak, the law imposes a duty of diligence on the collecting bank to scrutinize checks deposited with it for the purpose of determining their genuineness and regularity. The collecting bank being primarily engaged in banking holds itself out to the public as the expert and the law holds it to high standard of conduct.
It  is  the  collecting  bank  that  generally  suffers  the  loss with regard to forged indorsements because  it  had  the  duty  to  ascertain  the  genuineness  of  all  prior indorsements considering that the act of presenting the check for payment to the drawee is an assertion that the party making the presentment has done its duty to ascertain the genuineness of the indorsements. 

Gempesaw vs. Court of Appeals
A forged signature is wholly inoperative, no one can gain title to the instrument through such forged insdorsement. Such indorsement prevents any subsequent partyfrom acquiring any right as against parties prior to the forgery. Although rights may exist between and among parties subsequent to the forged instrument, not one of the can acquire rights agasint parties prior to the forgery. Such forged instrument cuts-off the rights of all subsequent parties as against parties prior to the forgery. However, the law makes an exception to these rules where party is precluded from setting up forgery as a defense.

Associated Bank vs. Court of Appeals
When a check is deposited with the collecting bank, it takes a risk on its depositor. It is only logical that this bank be held accountable for checks deposited by its customers. It is important to mention that Payee whose signature was forged may directly proceed against the collecting bank. However, the drawer cannot opt to recover from the collecting bank. There is no privity of contract between the drawer and the collecting bank.

Metrobank vs. First National City Bank
When the indorsement itself is very clear when it begins with the words “For clearance, clearing office” such indorsement must be read together with the 24-hour rule regulation of the House operations of the Central Bank. Once that 24-hour period is over, the liability on such indorsement has ceased. Failure of drawee bank to call the attention of collecting bank to the alteration of the check in question until after the lapse of 24 hours negates whatever right it might have against the collecting bank. Its remedy lies not against collecting bank but against the party responsible for the changing of the name of the payee and the amount on the face of the check.

Republic Bank vs. Court of Appeals
The 24-hour clearing house rule is valid rule applicable to commercial banks. As general rule, the collecting bank or last endorser bears the loss when the indorsement was forged. But the unqualified endorsement of the collecting bank on the check should be read together with the 24-hour regulation on the clearing house operation. Thus, when the drawee bank fails to return a forged or altered check to the collecting bank is absolved from liability. Unless an alteration is attributable to the fault or negligence of the drawer himself, the remedy of the drawee bank that negligently clears a forged and/or honor altered check for payment is against the party responsible for the forgery or alteration, otherwise, it bears the loss.

Philippine Commercial International Bank vs. Court of Appeals
A bank (in this case PCIB) which cashes a check drawn upon another bank (in this case Citibank), without requiring proof as to the identity of persons presenting it, or making inquiries with regard to them, cannot hold the proceeds against the drawee when the proceeds of the checks were afterwards diverted to the hands of a third party.

Ramon Illusorio vs. Court of Appeals
The collecting bank or last endorser generally suffers the loss because it has the duty to ascertain the genuineness of all prior indorsements considering that the act of presenting the check for payment to the drawee is an assertion that the party making the presentment has done its duty to ascertain the genuineness of the indorsements. As between the drawer and the drawee bank, the drawee bank should bear the loss. The drawee bank shall have recourse against the collecting bank because such collecting bank guarantees that all prior endorsements are genuine. The collecting bank then can go against the forger. In cases involving a forged check, where the drawer’s is forged, drawer can recover from the drawee bank. No drawee bank has a right to pay a forged check. If it does, it shall have to recredit the amount of check to the account of the drawer. The liability chain ends with drawee bank whose responsibility it is to know the drawer’s signature since the latter is its customer.


Samsung Construction Co. Phils, Inc vs. FEBTC and CA
Under Sec. 62 of NIL, among the warranties to be assumed by the acceptor is it admits the existence of the drawer, the genuineness of his signature, and his capacity and authority to draw the instrument. It is incumbent upon the drawee bank to ascertain the genuineness of the signature of its depositor. The respondent bank in this case did not exercise the degree of diligence required to enable it to detect the forgery. Aside from the warranties as an indorser, the collecting bank is made liable because it is privy to the depositor who negotiated the check because it knows him, his address and history for being a client thereof. Thus, it is in a better position to detect forgery or irregularity in the indorsement aka “Doctrine of Comparative Negligence”

Philippine National Bank vs. Court of Appeals
An alteration is said to be material if it alters the effect of the instrument. It means an unauthorized change in an instrument that purports to modify in any respect the obligation of a party or an unauthorized addition of words or numbers or other change to an incomplete instrument relating to the obligation of a party. In other words, material alteration is one which changes the items which is required to be stated under Sec 1 of NIL.

Sadaya vs. Sevilla
On  principle,  a  solidary  accommodation  maker—who  made  payment—has the right to contribution, from his co-accomodation maker, in the absence of agreement to the contrary between them, subject to conditions imposed by  law.    This  right  springs  from  an  implied  promise  to  share  equally  the burdens  thay  may  ensue  from  their  having  consented  to  stamp  their signatures on the promissory note.

Crisologo-Jose vs. Court of Appeals          
The provision of NIL which holds an accommodation party liable on the instrument to holder for value, although such holder at the time of taking the instrument knew him to be only an accommodation party, does not include nor apply to corporations which are accommodation parties. This is because the issue or indorsement of negotiable paper by a corporation without consideration and for accommodation of another is ultra vires. Hence, one who has taken the instrument with knowledge of the accommodation nature thereof cannot recover against a corporation where it is only a accommodation party.

Stelco Marketing vs. Court of Appeals
A person cannot be holder of the check for value if it does not meet the essential requisites prescribed by the law. He must become the holder of it before it was overdue, and without notice that it had previously dishonored,” and he took the check in good faith and for value before he can be considered as a holder of the check for value.

Travel-On BPI vs. Court of Appeals
Check which is regular on its face is deemed prima facie to have been issued for a valuable consideration and every person whose signature appears thereon is deemed to have become a party thereto for value. Further the rule is quite settled that a negotiable instrument is presumed to have been given or indorsed for a sufficient consideration unless otherwise contradicted and overcome by another evidence.

            In the accommodation transactions recognized by the NIL, an accommodating party lends his credit to the accommodated party, by issuing or indorsing a check which is held by the payee or indorsee as a holder in due course, who gave full value which the accommodated party must repay the accommodating party, unless of course the accommodating party intended to make a donation to the accommodated party. But the accommodating party is bound on the check to the holder in due course who is necessarily a third party and is not the accommodated party. Having issued or indorsed the check, the accommodating party has warranted to the holder in due course that he will pay the same according to its tenor.

De Ocampo vs. Gatchalian
Good faith on the part of the holder is presumed, such presumption is destroyed if the payee or indorsee acquired possession of the instrument under circumstances that should have put it to inquiry as to the title of the holder who negotiated the instrument. The burden is now on the part of the holder to show that notwithstanding the suspicious circumstances, it acquired in the actual good faith.

Mesina vs. IAC
The  holder  of  a  cashier’s  check  who  is  not  a  holder  in  due  course cannot  enforce  payment  against  the  issuing  bank  which  dishonors  the same.  If a payee of a cashier’s check obtained it from the issuing bank by fraud,  or  if  there  is  some  other  reason  why  the  payee  is  not  entitled  to collect  the  check,  the  bank  would  of  course  have  the  right  to  refuse payment of the check when presented by payee.

Metropol vs. Sambok
A qualified indorserment constitutes the indorser a mere assignor of the title to the instrument. It may be made by adding to the indorser’s signature the words “without recourse” or any words of similar import. Such indorsement relieves the indorser of the general obligation to pay if the instrument is dishonored but not of the liability arising from warranties on the instrument  as provided by section 65 of NIL. 

Recourse means resort to a person who is secondarily liable after the default of the person who is primarily liable. A person who indorses without qualification engages that on due presentment, the note shall be accepted or paid, or both as the case maybe, and that if it be dishonored, he will pay the amount thereof to the holder.

Sepiera vs. Court of Appeals
Every indorser who indorses without qualification, warrants to all subsequent holders in due course that, on due presentment, it shall be accepted or paid or both, according to its tenor, and that if it be dishonored and the necessary proceedings on dishonor be duly taken, he will pay the amount thereof to the holder or to any subsequent indorser who may be compelled to pay it. 

Prudencial Bank vs. IAC
Acceptance is presumed to be unqualified or absolute. If the drawee intends toqualify his acceptance, he must do so distinctly and unmistakably or else the acceptance will be taken as absolute.

Wong vs. Court of Appeals 
A check must be presented for payment within a reasonable time after its issue or the drawer will be discharged from liability thereon to the extent of the loss caused by the delay. By current banking practice, a check becomes stale after more than six (6) months, or 180 days.

The International Corporate Bank vs. Francis S. Gueco and Ma. Luz E Gueco
A stale check is one which has not been presented for payment within a reasonable time after its issue. It is valueless and, therefore, should not be paid. Under the negotiable instruments law, an instrument not payable on demand must be presented for payment on the day it falls due. When the instrument is payable on demand, presentment must be made within a reasonable time after its issue. In the case of a bill of exchange, presentment is sufficient if made within a reasonable time after the last negotiation thereof. A check must be presented for payment within a reasonable time after its issue, and in determining what is a "reasonable time," regard is to be had to the nature of the instrument, the usage of trade or business with respect to such instruments, and the facts of the particular case. The test is whether the payee employed suchdiligence as a prudent man exercises in his own affairs. This is because the nature and theory behind the useof a check points to its immediate use and payability.

State Investment House Inc. vs. CA
The withdrawal of the money from the drawee bank to avoid liability on the checks cannot prejudice the rights of holders in due course. For the reason that the holder who takes the negotiated paper makes a contract with the parties on the face of the instrument; there is an implied representation that funds or credit are available for the payment of the instrument in the bank upon which it is withdrawn.

Bataan Cigar and Cigarette Factory, Inc. vs. CA
In order to preserve the credit worthiness of checks, jurisprudence has pronounced that crossing a check should have the following effects: (1) check may not be encashed but only deposited in the bank; (2) the check may be negotiated only once, to one who has an account with a bank; (3) and the act of crossing the check serves as a warning to the holder that the check has been issued for a definite purpose so that he must inquire if he has received the check pursuant to that purpose, otherwise he is not a holder in due course.

Citytrust banking Corp., vs. Intermediate Appellate Court
Even there was error on the account number the controlling in determining in whose account the deposit is name of the account owner. This is so because it is not likely to commit an error in one’s name than merely relying on numbers which are difficult to remember. Numbers are for the convenience of the bank but was never intended to disregard the real name of its depositors. The bank is engaged in business impressed with public trust, and it is its duty to protect in return its clients and depositors who transact business with it.

Tan vs. Court of Appeals
A cashier’s check is a primary obligation of the issuing bank and accepted in advance by its mere issuance, and by its peculiar character and general use in the commercial world is regarded substantially to be as good as the money which it represents.

Papa vs. A.U. Valencia
After more than 10 years from the payment in part by cash and in part by check, the presumption is that the check had been encashed. Failure of the payee to encash a check for more than 10 years undoubtedly resulted in the impairment of the check through his unreasonable and unexplained delay.

Bank of the Philippine Islands vs. Court of Appeals
Every negotiable instrument is deemed prima facie to have been issued for a valuable consideration; every person whose signature appears thereon to have become a party thereto for value. Therefore, it is up to the party who alleges that there was absence of consideration to prove such fact.
The presumption will operate only if there was negotiation. Consideration is not presumed if there was transfer without indorsement.