Ylarde vs. Aquino

G.R. No. L-33722 July 29, 1988

GANCAYCO, J.:

In this petition for review on certiorari seeking the reversal of the decision of the Court of Appeals, a case which originated from the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, We are again caned upon determine the responsibility of the principals and teachers towards their students or pupils. 

Facts:

Mariano Soriano was the principal of the Gabaldon Primary School, a public educational institution located in Tayug, Pangasinan. Edgardo Aquino was a teacher therein. At that time, the school was fittered with several concrete blocks which were remnants of the old school shop that was destroyed in World War II. Realizing that the huge stones were serious hazards to the schoolchildren, another teacher by the name of Sergio Banez started burying them one by one.

Deciding to help his colleague, Aquino gathered eighteen of his male pupils, aged ten to eleven, after class dismissal. Being their teacher-in-charge, he ordered them to dig beside a one-ton concrete block in order to make a hole wherein the stone can be buried. The work was left unfinished. The following day, also after classes, Aquino called four of the original eighteen pupils to continue the digging. These four pupils — Reynaldo Alonso, Francisco Alcantara, Ismael Abaga and Novelito Ylarde, dug until the excavation was one meter and forty centimeters deep.

When the depth was right enough to accommodate the concrete block, Aquino and his four pupils got out of the hole. Then, Aquino left the children to level the loose soil around the open hole while he went to see Banez who was about thirty meters away. Private respondent wanted to borrow from Banez the key to the school workroom where he could get some rope.

Three of the four kids, Alonso, Alcantara and Ylarde, playfully jumped into the pit. Then, without any warning at all, the remaining Abaga jumped on top of the concrete block causing it to slide down towards the opening. Alonso and Alcantara were able to scramble out of the excavation on time but unfortunately fo Ylarde, the concrete block caught him before he could get out, pinning him to the wall in a standing position. As a result thereof, Ylarde sustained injuries and died three days after.

Ylarde's parents, petitioners in this case, filed a suit for damages against Aquino and Soriano. The lower court dismissed the complaint on the following grounds: (1) that the digging done by the pupils is in line with their course called Work Education; (2) that Aquino exercised the utmost diligence of a very cautious person; and (3) that the demise of Ylarde was due to his own reckless imprudence. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the lower court. 

Issues: 

 1)Whether or not Soriano is liable for damages under Art. 2180.

2) Whether or not Aquino is liable for damages under Art. 2176.

Held:

As regards the principal, We hold that he cannot be made responsible for the death of the child Ylarde, he being the head of an academic school and not a school of arts and trades. This is in line with Our ruling in Amadora vs. Court of Appeals, ⁴ wherein this Court thoroughly discussed the doctrine that under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, it is only the teacher and not the head of an academic school who should be answerable for torts committed by their students. This Court went on to say that in a school of arts and trades, it is only the head of the school who can be held liable.  Teachers in general shall be liable for the acts of their students except where the school is technical in nature, in which case it is the head thereof who shall be answerable. Following the canon of reddendo singula sinquilis 'teachers' should apply to the words "pupils and students' and 'heads of establishments of arts and trades to the word "apprentices." Soriano, as principal, cannot be held liable for the reason that the school he heads is an academic school and not a school of arts and trades. Besides, as clearly admitted by private respondent Aquino, private respondent Soriano did not give any instruction regarding the digging. 

  

Aquino is liable for damages, it is very clear that private respondent Aquino acted with fault and gross negligence when he: (1) failed to avail himself of services of adult manual laborers and instead utilized his pupils aged ten to eleven to make an excavation near the one-ton concrete stone which he knew to be a very hazardous task; (2) required the children to remain inside the pit even after they had finished digging, knowing that the huge block was lying nearby and could be easily pushed or kicked aside by any pupil who by chance may go to the perilous area; (3) ordered them to level the soil around the excavation when it was so apparent that the huge stone was at the brink of falling; (4) went to a place where he would not be able to check on the children's safety; and (5) left the children close to the excavation, an obviously attractive nuisance. 

The negligent act of Aquino in leaving his pupils in such a dangerous site has a direct causal connection to the death of the child Ylarde. Left by themselves, it was but natural for the children to play around. Tired from the strenuous digging, they just had to amuse themselves with whatever they found. Driven by their playful and adventurous instincts and not knowing the risk they were facing three of them jumped into the hole while the other one jumped on the stone. Since the stone was so heavy and the soil was loose from the digging, it was also a natural consequence that the stone would fall into the hole beside it, causing injury on the unfortunate child caught by its heavy weight. Everything that occurred was the natural and probable effect of the negligent acts of  Aquino. Needless to say, the child Ylarde would not have died were it not for the unsafe situation created by private respondent Aquino which exposed the lives of all the pupils concerned to real danger. 

In ruling that the child Ylarde was imprudent, it is evident that the lower court did not consider his age and maturity. This should not be the case. The degree of care required to be exercised must vary with the capacity of the person endangered to care for himself. A minor should not be held to the same degree of care as an adult, but his conduct should be judged according to the average conduct of persons of his age and experience.The standard of conduct to which a child must conform for his own protection is that degree of care ordinarily exercised by children of the same age, capacity, discretion, knowledge and experience under the same or similar circumstances.  Bearing this in mind, We cannot charge the child Ylarde with reckless imprudence.

The court is not persuaded that the digging done by the pupils can pass as part of their Work Education. A single glance at the picture showing the excavation and the huge concrete block would reveal a dangerous site requiring the attendance of strong, mature laborers and not ten-year old grade-four pupils. We cannot comprehend why the lower court saw it otherwise when Aquino himself admitted that there were no instructions from the principal requiring what the pupils were told to do. Nor was there any showing that it was included in the lesson plan for their Work Education.

 

The contention that Aquino exercised the utmost diligence of a very cautious person is certainly without cogent basis. A reasonably prudent person would have foreseen that bringing children to an excavation site, and more so, leaving them there all by themselves, may result in an accident. An ordinarily careful human being would not assume that a simple warning "not to touch the stone" is sufficient to cast away all the serious danger that a huge concrete block adjacent to an excavation would present to the children. Moreover, a teacher who stands in loco parentis to his pupils would have made sure that the children are protected from all harm in his company. 

Full text: http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1988/jul1988/gr_l_33722_1988.html

Philippine Rabbit vs. People of the Philippines

Philippine Rabbit vs. People

G.R. No. 147703             April 14, 2004

PANGANIBAN, J.:

Facts: Napoleon Roman was found guilty and convicted of the crime of reckless imprudence resulting to triple homicide, multiple physical injuries and damage to property and was sentenced to suffer imprisonment and to pay damages. The court further ruled that in the event of the insolvency of accused, petitioner shall be liable for the civil liabilities of the accused. Evidently, the judgment against accused had become final and executory.

Admittedly, accused had jumped bail and remained at-large. The CA ruled that the institution of a criminal case implied the institution also of the civil action arising from the offense. Thus, once determined in the criminal case against the accused-employee, the employer’s subsidiary civil liability as set forth in Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code becomes conclusive and enforceable.

Issue: Whether or not an employer, who dutifully participated in the defense of its accused-employee, may appeal the judgment of conviction independently of the accused.

Held: No.  It is well-established in our jurisdiction that the appellate court may, upon motion or motu proprio, dismiss an appeal during its pendency if the accused jumps bail. This rule is based on the rationale that appellants lose their standing in court when they abscond.

2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure has clarified what civil actions are deemed instituted in a criminal prosecution. When a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged shall be deemed instituted with the criminal action unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves the right to institute it separately or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action.

Only the civil liability of the accused arising from the crime charged is deemed impliedly instituted in a criminal action; that is, unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves the right to institute it separately, or institutes it prior to the criminal action. Hence, the subsidiary civil liability of the employer under Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code may be enforced by execution on the basis of the judgment of conviction meted out to the employee.

What is deemed instituted in every criminal prosecution is the civil liability arising from the crime or delict per se, but not those liabilities arising from quasi-delicts, contracts or quasi-contracts. In fact, even if a civil action is filed separately, the ex delicto civil liability in the criminal prosecution remains, and the offended party may -- subject to the control of the prosecutor -- still intervene in the criminal action, in order to protect the remaining civil interest therein.

The cases dealing with the subsidiary liability of employers uniformly declare that, strictly speaking, they are not parties to the criminal cases instituted against their employees. Although in substance and in effect, they have an interest therein, this fact should be viewed in the light of their subsidiary liability. While they may assist their employees to the extent of supplying the latter’s lawyers, as in the present case, the former cannot act independently on their own behalf, but can only defend the accused.

As a matter of law, the subsidiary liability of petitioner now accrues. Under Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code, employers are subsidiarily liable for the adjudicated civil liabilities of their employees in the event of the latter’s insolvency. Thus, in the dispositive portion of its decision, the trial court need not expressly pronounce the subsidiary liability of the employer. In the absence of any collusion between the accused-employee and the offended party, the judgment of conviction should bind the person who is subsidiarily liable. In effect and implication, the stigma of a criminal conviction surpasses mere civil liability.

To allow employers to dispute the civil liability fixed in a criminal case would enable them to amend, nullify or defeat a final judgment rendered by a competent court. By the same token, to allow them to appeal the final criminal conviction of their employees without the latter’s consent would also result in improperly amending, nullifying or defeating the judgment. The decision convicting an employee in a criminal case is binding and conclusive upon the employer not only with regard to the former’s civil liability, but also with regard to its amount. The liability of an employer cannot be separated from that of the employee.

The subsidiary liability of petitioner is incidental to and dependent on the pecuniary civil liability of the accused-employee. Since the civil liability of the latter has become final and enforceable by reason of his flight, then the former’s subsidiary civil liability has also become immediately enforceable. Respondent is correct in arguing that the concept of subsidiary liability is highly contingent on the imposition of the primary civil liability.

Full text: http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2004/apr2004/gr_147703_2004.html

Borromeo vs. Sun

Borromeo vs Sun
G.R. No. 75908. October 22, 1999
PURISIMA, J

At bar is a Petition for review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court seeking to set aside the Resolution of the then Intermediate Appellate Court, which reversed its earlier Decision setting aside the Decision of the former Court of the First Instance of Rizal.

Facts: 

Amancio Sun brought before the then Court of the First Instance of Rizal an action against Lourdes O. Borromeo (in her capacity as corporate secretary), Federico O. Borromeo and Federico O. Borromeo (F.O.B.), Inc., to compel the transfer to his name in the books of F.O.B., Inc., shares of stock registered in the name of Federico O. Borromeo, as evidenced by a Deed of Assignment. Private respondent averred that all the shares of stock of F.O.B. Inc. registered in the name of Federico O. Borromeo belong to him, as the said shares were placed in the name of Federico O. Borromeo 'only to give the latter personality and importance in the business world.' On the other hand, petitioner Federico O. Borromeo disclaimed any participation in the execution of the Deed of Assignment, theorizing that his supposed signature thereon was forged. LL

The lower court of origin came out with a decision declaring the questioned signature on subject Deed of Assignment as the genuine signature of Federico O. Borromeo. After considering the testimonies of the two expert witnesses for the parties and after a careful and judicious study and analysis of the questioned signature as compared to the standard signatures. On appeal by petitioners, the Court of Appeals adjudged as forgery the controverted signature of Federico O. Borromeo. Amancio Sun interposed a motion for reconsideration of the said decision, contending that Segundo Tabayoyong, petitioners' expert witness, is not a credible witness. Acting on the aforesaid motion for reconsideration, the Court of Appeals reconsidered its decision.

Issue: WON the signature of Frederico O. Borromeo in the Deed of Assignments is a genuine signature.

Held:

Pertinent records reveal that the subject Deed of Assignment is embodied in blank form for the assignment of shares with authority to transfer such shares in the books of the corporation. It was clearly intended to be signed in blank to facilitate the assignment of shares from one person to another at any future time. This is similar to Section 14 of the Negotiable Instruments Law where the blanks may be filled up by the holder, the signing in blank being with the assumed authority to do so. Indeed, as the shares were registered in the name of Federico O. Borromeo just to give him personality and standing in the business community, private respondent had to have a counter evidence of ownership of the shares involved. Thus, the execution of the deed of assignment in blank, to be filled up whenever needed. The same explains the discrepancy between the date of the deed of assignment and the date when the signature was affixed thereto.

While it is true that the 1974 standard signature of Federico O. Borromeo is to the naked eye dissimilar to his questioned signature circa 1954-1957, which could have been caused by sheer lapse of time, Col. Jose Fernandez, respondent's expert witness, found the said signatures similar to each other after subjecting the same to stereomicroscopic examination and analysis because the intrinsic and natural characteristic of Federico O. Borromeo's handwriting were present in all the exemplar signatures used by both Segundo Tabayoyong and Col. Jose Fernandez.